A random walk in the literature on criminality: a partial and critical view on some statistical analysis and modeling approaches by Gordon, Mirta B.
A random walk in the literature on criminality: a partial
and critical view on some statistical analysis and
modeling approaches
Mirta B. Gordon
To cite this version:
Mirta B. Gordon. A random walk in the literature on criminality: a partial and critical view
on some statistical analysis and modeling approaches. 2010. <hal-00404405v2>
HAL Id: hal-00404405
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00404405v2
Submitted on 3 Mar 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
A random walk in the literature on criminality:
a partial and critical view on some statistical analysis and
modeling approaches
Mirta B. Gordon
Laboratoire TIMC-IMAG (UMR 5525), University of Grenoble I
Domaine de La Merci - Jean Roget 38706 La Tronche, France
March 3, 2010
Abstract
We are interested in the possible contributions of mathematical modeling of
crime. We refer to numerous and quite recent papers that analyze and discuss
empirical data in an attempt to discover stylized trends worthy of being understood
through simple models. We summarize part of this literature and try to understand
the reasons of important discrepancies in their conclusions. Then we present some
recent modeling attempts that may help to understand the large variance in the
statistical based conclusions.
1 Introduction
Criminology is intrinsically a pluri-disciplinary subject. Along history different schools
of thought have proposed different and sometimes conflictive ways of considering crime.
We are interested in the possible contributions of mathematical modeling. In an at-
tempt to discover stylized trends worthy of being understood through simple models,
we referred to numerous and quite recent papers that analyze and discuss empirical
data. In the following we summarize part of this literature trying to extract general
conclusions. Then we present some recent modeling attempts that may help to un-
derstand the large variance in the statistical based conclusions. Certain models are
developed more in depth in other papers of this issue.
The reasons why crimes are committed and how and when they should be punished
have always been questions of main concern in organized societies. Different attitudes
have been adopted to prevent or deter crime, from the lex talionis principle (“an eye
for an eye...”) and death penalty to different kinds of sanctions more or less correlated
with the gravity of the offense, like incapacitation by imprisonment, fines, etc.
One would expect modern law enforcement policies to be based on theories, sup-
ported by empirical evidence grasped from statistics but this is far from being the case.
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For example, there is a widespread belief that a hard sentence not only incapacitates
the convicted criminal, but would have a deterrent effect on potential offenders and help
to prevent recidivism. Yet, as discussed in section 2, the deterrent effect of punishment
is a highly polemic subject. Also, law experts diverge with respect to whether offenders
may be rehabilitated or should simply be punished (see for example the recent public
discussion in France [93, 94]).
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Figure 1: Crime rates in USA (data from U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics) per 100 000 inhabitants
Thanks to data availability in the USA after World War II, at the end of the 1960s
it became evident that there was a dramatic rise in criminality (see figure 1). Although
this rise is by far not the most dramatic in terms of slope for the time period shown in
the figure, at the end of that decade crime modeling emerged as a field worthy of being
investigated. Figures 2 show that all the crime categories present alike time evolutions.
Similar trends have been reported in countries of western Europe. For example, in
figure 3 data from France and USA are plotted together. There is a striking delay of
several years between the curves, but they both present peaks and drops that are the
subject of many investigations. Analogous curves for Germany are published by Entorf
and Spengler [34].
The overall increase of criminal activity between the 1960s and the 1980s has led
some sectors of the population and politicians to ask for harder penalties. In the USA
some states implemented harsh law enforcement policies invoking a famous paper called
Broken windows: The police and neighborhood safety, published in 1982 by James Q.
Wilson and George L. Kelling [102]. The authors claimed, without clear empirical
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Figure 2: Left: Rates of different types of property crimes in USA per 100 000 inhabitants.
Right: Rates of different categories of violent crimes in USA per 100 000 inhabitants (notice
the different scale with respect to the figure on the right)
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Figure 3: Crime rates in USA and in France (data from INSEE: Institut National de la
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques) per 100 000 inhabitants
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evidence (see Harcourt and Ludwig [55] for a discussion) that “... if a window in a
building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken”.
The conclusion was that “... the police — and the rest of us — ought to recognize
the importance of maintaining, intact, communities without broken windows”. Quite
naturally it was deduced that a policy of zero tolerance was the way of preventing crime.
This policy, first implemented in New York in 1990, has been followed by Chicago and
Los Angeles. In fact, crime rates have dramatically decreased in the following years
... although not only in these but in all (or almost all) the US largest cities [55]. The
soaring crime rate between the 60’s and the 80’s and the unexpected quasi monotonic
decrease beginning at the 90’s are subject of intense investigation and debate. Why
this drop took place and whether there is a marginally larger drop in cities that applied
the zero tolerance policies is a question that has not received a clear answer yet.
2 Empirical results
Early attempts to discover relationships between crime and social factors using statistics
may be traced back to Quetelet, who coined the term “Social Physics” in 19th century
[90]. However, it is only recently that crime is being investigated systematically, with
attempts to explain observed trends based on statistics and on different life-course
surveys. We discuss these approaches in section 2.1.
Other valuable sources of data are longitudinal studies of cohorts, mainly of young
men, containing detailed individual trajectories or “criminal careers”. These approaches
are considered in section 2.2.
2.1 Statistics
It has become commonplace to argue that statistical data are voluminous and incon-
clusive. However, statistics are essential to discover stylized facts and validate theories.
In this section we summarize some published results in criminometric studies (a term
proposed by Eide [33]) and we try to understand the faced difficulties.
A very large production of statistical analyses since the early 1970s try to relate
crime rates to possible explicative variables, generally through least squares linear re-
gressions. The models assume that
crime rate = f(explicative variables) (1)
where f(.) is a linear function and the explicative variables are selected by the authors
depending on the question they are interested in and on data availability. Among the
explicative variables considered in the literature we find average income, inequality,
gender, age, education level, race and/or any other variable thought to be related to
delinquency.
Geographically aggregated statistical data, based on justice or police contacts —
sometimes corrected for systematic biases and underreporting—, are obtained from
governmental agencies. They may present some inaccuracies due to the fact that they
are not specifically collected for research. Many of the conclusions in the literature
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are drawn from American data issued of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), collected
annually since 1930 by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). Maltz and Targonski
[78] cautioned in 20021 that, although available, data from the UCR at the City and
County levels provided by the FBI’s UCR Program are unreliable. They may have
non-systematic errors, which cannot be corrected, due to a lack of reports from some
local agencies. Apparently, few researchers were aware of these problems, which may
have spoiled investigations at the level of individual cities.
Data sources of other countries are less easily available and have been much less in-
vestigated. The conclusions drawn by different authors are contradictory. For example,
in a survey of crime factors in Germany, with data of 11 German Laender over 1975-
1996 (all types of crime), Entorf and Spengler (2000) [34] conclude that higher income
and also higher urbanization are associated with higher crime rates, while Fajnzylber
et al (2002) [36], based on data of homicide and robbery from ≈ 45 countries over
1970-1994, conclude that average income is not correlated with (violent) crime, and
that higher urbanization is associated with higher robbery rates but not with homicide
rates.
As Eide [33] points out in an interesting survey of statistical approaches of criminal
behavior, equation (1) is meaningful only if the explicative variables are not simul-
taneous with the crime rates. Otherwise, one cannot consider the arguments of the
function as actually “explicative” ; they may at best (if the coefficients are significa-
tive) be correlated with crime rates, but such an equation does not allow to deduce that
these variables are “causes” of crime. For example, if crime rates and probabilities of
punishment are negatively correlated, one cannot distinguish between the hypothesis
that higher probabilities of punishment cause lower crime rates or the hypothesis that
higher crime rates cause lower probabilities of punishment (because of police overload-
ing). Thus, studies that consider simultaneous (cross-sectional) data can only detect
correlations. Recent papers consider lagged variables, i.e. independent variables at
period t − l, generally with l = 1 or l = 2, when explaining crime rates at time t (see
for example [36]). However, the lag to be used is not evident and depends on the type
of variable. For example, conviction sentences, which the subsequent increase in prison
population, may arise one or two years after the crime perpetration.
Methodological problems may also be the source of disagreement between studies.
Recently, Spelman [99] discussed in detail the relationship between crime and prison
rates, comparing conclusions of 13 published studies on similar data using different
technical specifications for the analysis. He shows that the discrepancies in the results
depend on the methods rather than on real differences in the data sets. The author
shows that, not surprisingly, there is a strong time auto-correlation of both variables
(crime rates and prison population): most criminals active at some year were active
the preceding year and will remain active in the near future, and similarly for the
number of inmates. Thus, changes can only be expected on the long run (7 to 10
years), depending on the characteristics of the younger cohorts and the implemented
policies. The divergence in the findings are mainly due to the treatment of time series
correlations. Some studies relied on differences (variables are expressed in the form
1A warning exists now on the FBI’s web site.
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∆Xt = Xt −Xt−1), others used the values Xt and adjusted for time correlations, and
others did not account for serial correlation at all. Although in the short run current
crime rates and prison populations may appear correlated, it is not clear whether there
is any causality link between them. Other drawbacks of the analyses of aggregate data
are also mentioned by Levitt [73] who gives examples showing how failure in the data
selection may lead to spurious conclusions. For example, too aggregated data may
obscure links that exist clearly at local levels: ... if having a criminal record makes it
difficult to find a job, or high crime rates in an area drive away businesses or customers,
then crime may cause unemployment, rather than vice versa. Also, failing to include
pertinent variables may lead to unfounded conclusions: ... if alcohol consumption falls
when the economy is doing poorly, and alcohol use leads to crime, then failing to account
for the alcohol-crime link may lead to a spurious result in which more unemployment
leads to less crime. In that case, however, it is the changing alcohol consumption, not
the unemployment, which is playing the causal role.
In some cases the data corresponding to the explicative variables of the theory
are unavailable and authors use more or less ad hoc “proxies” whose correlation with
the variables they are supposed to represent is not always convincingly demonstrated.
These procedures introduce biases that are seldom if ever discussed. A non exhaustive
list of proxies used in the literature includes female participation rate in the labor mar-
ket as a proxy for the proportion of unguarded homes [17] ; number of police personnel
per 100,000 inhabitants and the existence of death penalty as a proxy for severity of
punishment [36] ; per capita drug arrests as a proxy for certainty of punishment [65] ;
death rate among prisoners as a proxy for prison conditions [59] ; demographic char-
acteristics of those who get arrested as a proxy of the demographic characteristics of
those who offend [10] ; false arrests serve as a proxy for the degree of harassment of
the community by the police [26] ; arrest information as a proxy for criminal offending
– which is common in the crime literature (error-free criminal offending data does not
exist) ; the arrest date is a proxy for the date of crime commission (due primarily to a
reporting problem – officers do not always submit information on the offense date [69]) ;
the mean family income as an indicator of illegal income opportunities for criminals
[30, 34].
A same proxy may be given almost opposite interpretations in different investiga-
tions: “Because illegal income opportunities cannot be directly measured, a proxy is
needed. Ehrlich (1973) [30] proposes the mean family income as such a measure. He
argues that higher income means a higher level of transferable assets in the community
and, thus, more lucrative targets for potential criminals. Other authors use the same
variable to measure legal income opportunities. They argue that higher absolute wealth
is an indicator for more rewarding legal jobs. Which interpretation is more appropri-
ate?” [34].
The conclusions of regressions on available data are thus considered with circum-
spection. There is a long list of discrepancies between studies. Among the contentious
variables thought to be relevant to explain crime rates we find:
Punishment and deterrence. There are two different aspects of punishment: the fre-
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quency at which illegal actions are punished (which corresponds to the punishment
probability in the models), and the severity of the punishment itself. The main ques-
tion in debate is whether frequency and severity have any deterrent effect (besides inca-
pacitation during the imprisonment period) on the punished offender and on would-be
offenders. Early results by Ehrlich [30, 31], who found a deterrent effect of capital
punishment, have been shown to be very sensitive to statistical treatments [10]. A
recent meta-analysis of 104 published studies corroborates this unexplained sensibil-
ity: conclusions from time series and panel data give evidence for a deterrent effect of
executions while cross sectional data do not [107].
There is some agreement that crime rates are (negatively) correlated with the prob-
ability of punishment but not with punishment severity [33]), but it is not clear whether
the deterrent and incapacitation effects of incarceration are greater than any criminal-
ization effects of the incarceration.
More recent investigations cast doubts on the effectiveness of incarceration itself as
a crime control policy. For example, based on a meta-analysis of 117 published stud-
ies involving slightly less than half a million offenders, Smith, Goggin and Gendreau
[98] conclude that different types of sanctions (incarceration or community-based sanc-
tions) did not produce decreases in recidivism neither on juveniles, females, or minority
groups. Moreover, there were some indications that increasing lengths of incarceration
were associated with slightly greater increases in recidivism. They conclude that pris-
ons and intermediate sanctions should not be used with the expectation of reducing
criminal behaviour.
Villetaz, Killias and Zoder [101] compare recidivism of offenders according to whether
they have been incarcerated or punished through an alternative non-custodial sanction
(typically probation). After examination of more than 3 000 published and unpublished
abstracts they keep only 27 studies considered sufficiently rigorous. They find that the
rate of re-offending after a non-custodial sanction is significantly lower than after a
custodial sanction in 11 studies, in 14 there is no significant difference on re-offending
between both sanctions, and two out of 27 comparisons are in favour of custodial sanc-
tions. Despite these results, that favor non-custodial sanctions, no significant difference
in recidivism is found in a meta-analysis restricted to four available controlled (ran-
domized) trials and one natural experiment judged by the authors to have reached the
required standard. In contrast with the study by Gendreau and collaborators cited
above, prevalence of offending is found to decrease after any type of sanction or inter-
vention, independently of its severity.
A very recent study based on a natural experiment in Italy [28] corroborates the
general deterrence hypothesis: increasing the expected punishment lowers the propen-
sity to recommit a crime (at least within the seven months following release). However,
this effect decreases with the length of the prison spell: more severe punishments are
found to decrease the sensitivity to the threat of future punishment.
One has to keep in mind, when comparing results on deterrence, that they crucially
depend on the time periods considered to observe recidivism.
Police. The belief that strong police forces reduces crime has been challenged. Realizing
that the number of police officers in the U.S.A. increases mostly in election years, Levitt
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[70] considered the consequences of this variation (uncorrelated to crime) on crime
rates. He finds that such increases substantially reduce violent crime, but have a small
impact on property crime. These results have been criticized [62, 81] and the debate
that followed [74] shows how difficult it is to assess the impact of police on crime. On
the other hand, the social benefit of reducing crime is not necessarily larger than the
cost of hiring additional police. For example, Freeman [42] estimated that the overall
cost of crime in the US in 1993 was of the order of 4 percent of the GDP, 2 per cent
lost to crime and 2 percent spent on controlling crime. This amounts to an average
of about 54, 000 dollars/year for each of the 5 million or so men incarcerated, put on
probation or paroled in that year. Interestingly, this number grew up to about 7,4
million in 2006. If the unit costs remained the same, the overall cost of crime would
reach 400 billion dollars per year.
There is also a long standing debate about the zero-tolerance policy in New York,
which, according to Kelling and Sousa [61], had a positive impact. In a recent pub-
lication, Harcourt and Ludwig [55] criticize their data treatments and, using evidence
from a social experiment involving 4 800 low income families, conclude that there is no
support for a simple first-order disorder-crime relationship, and that broken windows
policing is not the optimal use of scarce law enforcement resources. Although recent
experiments show that disorder helps spreading of disorder [60], it is not evident that
misdemeanors and more serious crimes belong to the same category of delinquency,
requiring the same policy.
Unemployment. There is no agreement on the effect of unemployment rates on crime
rates [10]. Levitt [73] argues that it is difficult to obtain significative insight on this
issue from aggregated time series data at the national level, because unemployment has
a very large variability at the local level. Unfortunately, as already mentioned, local
crime rates data in the US may be flawed.
In Europe, the mentioned study of crime in Germany [34] takes into account the di-
versity of unemployment figures in the different Laender, and finds that unemployment
has no significant effects on crime rates. Unfortunately, the worldwide panel study
by Fajnzylber et al. [36] does not consider unemployment among the independent
variables.
Income inequality. The relationship between income inequality and victimization is also
controversial, as already mentioned (see the methodological discussion by Levitt [73]).
Becker’s economic model of crime would suggest that as income distribution becomes
wider, the richer become increasingly attractive targets for the poorer, and early results
[30] seemed to confirm that criminality is positively correlated with inequality. In the
mentioned cross-country analysis [36] both income inequality and economic growth turn
out to be robust determinants of violent crime rates. Similar results are obtained by
Kelly [62] who finds that inequality is highly correlated with violent crime but that its
correlation with property crime is ambiguous: it depends on the variables chosen for
the regressions.
As discussed below (see section 3.2), a non linear model [11] suggests that what
matters is the fraction of the population below some wealth threshold, and not the
8
global measure of inequality used in standard linear regressions. Application of this
model to crime rates of the 7 largest cities in Colombia shows that would be criminals
are to be found among people with income below 80% of the mean. An interesting
corollary is that distributional changes among people whose income is above this limit
would not have any influence on crime rates.
On the other hand, Levitt [72] finds that, probably because rich people engage in
behaviors that reduces their victimization, the trend in USA between 1970 and 1990 is
that property crime victimization has become increasingly concentrated on the poor.
Education. Another subject thoroughly investigated is the influence of the education
level. Ehrlich (1975b) [32] argues, using statistics of property crimes committed across
the U.S. in 1960, that committing crimes against property is attractive for young age
individuals of low educational level, but crimes involving fraud, embezzlement and
illegal commercial practices bear a positive relationship with the average number of
school years completed by the adult population. On the other hand, Tauchen and Witte
[104] find that, although going to work or school tends to reduce the probability of being
involved in criminal activities, having a high school degree has no significant effect.
More recently, Lochner and Moretti [76] found that schooling significantly reduces the
probability of incarceration and arrest. However, these results are based on types of
crimes that do not allow to discriminate between the two categories pointed out by
Ehrlich.
Others. There is a famous controversy concerning the evidence put forward by Donohue
and Levitt [25] that legalization of abortion in the 70’s explains 50% of the drop in
criminality starting at the 90s, roughly eighteen years after. The authors argue that
the drop is due to the lack of unwanted children that would have otherwise been raised
in conditions that favor criminal behavior. To come up against criticism [58, 41], the
authors provided new evidence in favor of this claim [27, 24].
Some results of the statistical analysis are considered as being robust. For example,
there is strong agreement on the fact that crime is correlated with age [71] (most crim-
inals are young) and gender [42] (7% of the US workforce were men under supervision
of the criminal justice system in 1993). In 1995, 94% of the prison population, 90% of
the jail population, and 79% of the persons on probation were male [43]. In 2004, for
an estimated population of 209 671 644 inhabitants, the FBI reports a total of 9 966 877
arrests. Figure 4 shows the corresponding age distribution. Among them, 76.2% were
males and 23.8% females. Males accounted for 82.1% of the total number of arrestees
for violent crimes and 68.1% of the total for property crimes.
The gender gap in France is even larger: figure 5 shows the number of convictions
in France between 1990 and 2006 ; females are about 10 times less represented than
males.
In conclusion, after an overview of the literature we identify two different kinds of
problems faced by statistical studies. On one hand, data sources are not always reliable
because crime data are not “given”, they contain gaps that are generally filled by the
Agency collecting the data. One should care about how this is done, and whether the
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same methodology has been used for all the time covered by the analysis [78]. On
the other hand, there are methodological issues concerning the statistical treatments
of data, so that the results should be interpreted with care. Some authors claim that
only well randomized controlled trials can give useful and unbiased information about
the crime variables [38, 63].
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Figure 6: Graphic representation of Buenos Aires data
Graphic representations may prove to be useful when analyzing statistical data.
However, besides the recent use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to visualize
the spatial distributions of crime hot spots, most criminometric studies exhibit tables
with the numerical results but seldom make use of graphic representations that would
help to visualize and support their conclusions. When there exist, graphs are generally
restricted to the representation of the input data as histograms, crime rates vs. time,
etc. Consider for example the discussion about the possible correlations of crime with
inequality and unemployment in Buenos Aires [100, 56]. Publication [56] performs dif-
ferent regressions, including several dummies – one in particular to test whether the
Mexican tequila crisis affected the Argentine economy, concluding that crime is better
correlated with inequality than with unemployment. Clearly the time series is too short
to extract general conclusions but, since the data have been published together with the
regression analysis, we use them here to exhibit the interest of graphic representations.
Figures 6(a), 6(b) and 6(c) represent the bare data (inequality – measured by the Gini
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index –, unemployment rates and inflation) together with crime rates, as a function of
time. It is clear that, at least qualitatively, crime rates over the overall period are corre-
lated with inequality more closely than with unemployment or inflation. However, what
is most striking on these figures is that the phenomena follow very different patterns
before and after 1991, the year at which the Argentine Government established the par-
ity peso-dolar, a huge shock in the economy, in order to control hyperinflation. Before
1991 crime rates are extremely well correlated with inequality and there is also a posi-
tive correlation with one-year-lagged inflation (surprisingly, and probably meaningless,
increasing crime rate seems to prefigure inflation growth), but not with unemployment.
After 1991 crime rates are correlated with both Gini index and unemployment, but not
at all with inflation, because due to the parity the latter remains almost constant. This
change was probably captured by the dummy D90 introduced without any comment
in some regressions. We see that the graphic representation allows to discover just by
visual inspection all the results obtained using state-of-the-art statistical analysis. The
latter, guided by these visual tools, helps quantifying the qualitative findings.
Finally, as LaFree [66] pointed out, one of the more striking facts in criminological
studies is ahistoricism, rooted in the assumption that theory and history should be
separated. The example analyzed in the las paragraph also shows dramatically that
economic shocks (or others, like beginning or ending of wars, etc.) may give raise to
phase transitions, i.e. sudden changes in the behavior of the system, and should not be
ignored. Moreover, phase transitions between different regimes may arise endogenously,
due to social interactions. Regressions in that case should be done separately for each
regime. Linear regressions on all the data may completely miss such nonlinearities. An
interesting exception is the work by French and Heagerty [44] who are interested in the
consequence of a policy change, and exhibit graphics to explain their procedures.
2.2 Criminal careers
Micro-level longitudinal research designs give information about how criminal behavior
evolves over time within individuals (see the special issue of the Journal of Quantita-
tive Criminology for recent contributions [80]). In these studies, a set of individuals
are followed-up along a portion of their lives. They raise ethical problems due to fear
of their use for forecasting individual trajectories based on very early “symptoms”,
without taking into account that statistical data cannot predict individual behavior.
Interestingly, Quetelet warned against such use of statistics in the introduction to his
book [90]: Ces lois, par la manie`re meˆme dont on les a de´termine´es, ne pre´sentent plus
rien d’individuel et par conse´quent, on ne saurait les appliquer aux individus que dans
de certaines limites. Toutes les applications qu’on voudrait en faire a` un homme en
particulier seraient essentiellement fausses ; de meˆme que si l’on pre´tendait de´terminer
l’e´poque a` laquelle une personne doit mourir, en faisant usage des tables de mortalite´ 2.
Recently, T. Mathiesen [79] has strongly criticized the use of statistical results as jus-
2These laws, due to the way they have been obtained, do not represent anything individual and
consequently should be applied to individuals only within certain limits. All the applications to an
individual in particular would be essentially false ; in the same way as if one would pretend to determine
the time when a person has to die using mortality tables.
12
tifications of Court decisions.
Longitudinal data of criminal careers, including self-reported delinquency from sys-
tematic cohort studies, are available mainly in the USA and in Great Britain. For
example, the Pittsburgh Youth Study3 (started in 1987 and ending in ≈ 2000-01, with
data of about 1 500 boys of three different school grades that were periodically inter-
viewed at annual intervals) contains the number of self-reported acts of delinquency
committed by each boy. There are two Philadelphia Cohort Studies [105, 39] that con-
tain social and demographic data of more than 10 000 boys born in 1945 (followed from
ages 10 to 18) and in 1958 (followed from ages 4 to 26) respectively. The Rochester
Youth Development Study (RYDS) is a multi-wave panel study (starting in 1988) of
the development of delinquent behavior among adolescents and young adults ; self-
reported acts of a panel of 1 000 adolescents, among which 12% are non-offenders, span
a period from when the average age of sample members was 13.5 to when the average
age was 22. The Cambridge Study [37] contains data of ≈ 400 young males in Great
Britain over the period 1961-1981, selected because of the prior expectation of a high
prevalence of convictions (about a quarter) among them. Interestingly, about 60% were
never convicted during the 20 years spanned by the study ([64], see also [19]) meaning
that the sample contains a relatively low number of offenders (about 160 individuals),
a problem that also exists in the other databases. Besides the small number, there
are other difficulties with longitudinal data. First, some rely on offenders self-reported
criminal behavior, which is not above suspicion [79]. Another is attrition, which may
introduce a possible bias on studies because one cannot exclude that individuals who
drop out of a longitudinal study differ in important ways from individuals who do not
[12].
In the following we present some published results.
An investigation carried out on the Cambridge database considered the number of
convictions n of each individual. The frequency f(n) with which each number of con-
victions was observed follows a power law as a function of the number of convictions,
f = αnβ [19]. This corroborates the general observation that a small number of offend-
ers are responsible for a disproportionate share of total crime [42]. For example, in the
Philadelphia 1946-cohort study, there are 3 595 juvenile offenders who are responsible of
10 214 offenses. A power law distribution may reflect the existence of social interactions
[2]. However, one should keep in mind that these conclusions are based on a small data
set and for slightly more than one decade of the independent variable n (0 ≤ n ≤ 14).
The most conspicuous characteristic of a power law distribution is that it has a fat tail
at large values of n, but here the range of the latter is intrinsically restricted, since it
cannot be larger than the total number of offenses committed by a single individual.
Interestingly, the self-reported offenses of the Pittsburgh Youth Study follows a similar
distribution [19].
Policy makers have been seeking to reduce crime more efficiently by targeting cor-
rections at the frequent offenders. The utility of this selective incapacitation has not
been demonstrated yet. Individual longitudinal data have been used for several studies.
In particular, a study based on the Philadelphia Birth Cohort data fails to find any
3http://www.wpic.pitt.edu/research/famhist/pys.htm
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evidence to support the argument that selective incapacitation is a practical strategy
for crime reduction [7]. In a recent simulation study, Blokland and Nieuwbeerta [9]
considered data from the “Criminal Career and Life Course Study” carried out at the
Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement, charting the com-
plete criminal careers of a large number of individuals. The authors estimate, through
simulations, the incapacitative effects of alternative selective prison policies. Accord-
ing to their results, costs of imprisonment typically exceed benefits gained from crimes
prevented. In other words, selective incapacitation may not yield a positive societal
result, a conclusion reached also by other studies [88]. A recent article by French and
Heagerty [44] reviews available statistical techniques for analyzing longitudinal data
in the context of evaluating a policy change. Piquero and Blumstein [89] argue that
improved estimates of incapacitation will come about only through greater knowledge
about individual crime-committing behavior.
Other kinds of studies try to identify typical patterns in criminal trajectories to im-
plement selective incapacitation. The purpose of selective incapacitation is to “select”
those particularly prone to violence and to incapacitate them. Longitudinal studies
might help to predict individual behavior by looking at the corresponding offending
career [68, 80]. Clearly this poses ethical and methodological problems, discussed in
particular by Mathiesen [79] in a controversial paper. He argues that predictions are
highly questionable in criminology because they are based on very inaccurate data. Ex-
periments involve a large number of false predictions which in turn raise serious ethical
problems because such predictions “... involve the intended infliction of pain, in the
form of punishment or penal sanctions, on the individual level.”.
Some methodological problems are related to the non-uniqueness of the results.
In order to extract general conclusions from longitudinal studies, one needs to cluster
together similar individual trajectories. The properties of clustering methods and algo-
rithms are mostly studied by the community of Machine Learning research [6, 40, 57,
106]. Clustering algorithms need much larger amounts of data than those available in
the above mentioned databases. They use a similarity measure to compare couples of
data. Results highly depend on this measure. Even mild differences in data encoding,
like using either offending frequencies or numbers of offenses, may result in quite differ-
ent clustering results. Also, depending on the clustering algorithm and in some cases
on the order of the data, very different solutions may be reached. These techniques,
mostly implemented for analysis of large data sets, pattern classification, dimension
reduction, etc. have been used in recent papers to characterize prototypical criminal
behaviors [84, 15, 64]. However, due to the small size of the data sets, some clusters in
these studies have too few individuals, with the risk of being artifacts.
Finally, let us mention recent attempts to use graphical methods for studying lon-
gitudinal statistical and idiosyncratic trajectories [77, 29].
3 Models in criminology
Mathematical models using tools or concepts from economy, biology, statistical physics,
as well as multi-agent simulations, contribute to the field of criminology with their own
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methods. These models do not try to predict actual data but to explain stylized facts
and understand the consequences of different hypothesis. In his paper “Connecting the
dots”, R. Rosenfeld [91] points out that “The role of theory in criminal justice is no dif-
ferent than in any other policy endeavor. Theory sets priorities for research, organizes
otherwise disparate research findings, and links research to policy and practice. The
relationship between theory and research is not a chicken-and-egg proposition. Theory
comes first”.
In a review paper, Alfred Blumstein [10] traces back the recent interest in crime
modeling to 1966, when the USA President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice created a Task Force on Science and Technology. Composed
mainly by engineers and scientists, its aim was to introduce simulation modeling to
evaluate the resource requirements and costs associated to a criminal case, from ar-
rest to release, by considering the flow through the justice system. For example, it
estimated the opportunity of incarceration of convicted criminals and the length of the
incarceration time. This kind of approaches belong to “engineering modeling” [1]. Here
we are mainly interested in mathematical “scientific models”, concerned with under-
standing the mechanisms at work in reality. Although the boundaries are not strict, in
the following we distinguish economic approaches from what we call hereafter “social
models”, that include non-linear effects and social interactions explicitly, like statistical
mechanics, differential equations and multi-agent modeling.
3.1 Economic models
Although the idea that the decision of committing a crime results from a trade off
between the expected profit and the risk of punishment dates back to the eighteen and
nineteenth centuries (Beccaria, Bentham), it is only in 1968 that the modern economic
approach to crime modeling was initiated by G. Becker [5].
Economic theory of criminality describes illegal behavior as the result of a rational
choice. Becker postulates a social loss function L which includes costs and benefits
of crime. Its minimization determines how many resources and how much punish-
ment should be used to enforce the law. L depends on the number of offenses O, the
probability of conviction p and the costs to offenders due to punishment f
L = D(O) + C(p,O) + fpO (2)
where D(O) is the social loss (damages) from offenses (produced harm minus gain to
offenders), C(p,O) is the social cost of incapacitation factors (aprehension and convic-
tion), and the last term represents the loss to the pO convicted criminals.
At the minimum of the social loss neither criminals, private individuals nor govern-
ment can expect to improve their benefits by changing their behaviors. This corresponds
to the Nash “equilibrium” between the “demand” of (or tolerance to) crime – reflected
by the expenditures for protection and law enforcement – and the “supply” of crimes
– reflected by the cost to offenders.
Under simplifying assumptions about the convexity of functions C and D, the model
determines how many offenses should be permitted and how many offenders should go
unpunished at the minimum of L. The model enables to think about the consequences
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of modifying policies. It allows to include relevant quantities (it may even take into
account the private expenditures against crime, the social cost of punishing innocent
persons and other policy drawbacks) in the definitions of D, C, etc.
Validation of the model would require enough data to determine the coefficients of
the different terms in a development to (at least) second order of (2), and some attempts
have been made. As we discussed in section 2, because the interpretation of crime
statistics is still unclear, the mentioned coefficients are difficult to estimate. On the
other hand, the conclusions of the model are very dependent on the assumed functional
forms, which sometimes have no other justification than mathematical simplicity or
intuition. In particular, the model does not consider possible non-linear effects due to
social influences.
Economic theories consider crime like any other good. There is a “market” of
crimes and individuals make rational decisions: a person commits an offence if his
expected utility exceeds the utility he could get with legal activities. The basic equation
underlying individual decisions, introduced by Ehrlich [30], relates the expected utility
of committing a crime E[U ], to the probability of capture and punishment p:
E[U ] = pU(b− f) + (1− p)U(b). (3)
The utility U(x) depends on the income x ; if the crime is not detected the income is b,
if it is punished, the income is b− f . All incomes, including psychological components
such as fear, excitement, pain, are assumed to be convertible to monetary equivalents
[46].
Depending on the assumptions about the quantities entering equation (3), i.e.
whether they depend on income, or on inequality, or any other variable, different au-
thors reach different and sometimes contradictory results. For example, Ehrlich [30]
concludes that there is a strong positive correlation between income inequality and
crimes against property. A subsequent study by Deutsch et al. [23] consider different
sources of inequality. They show that the results depend on whether the wealth inequal-
ity increases because of a personal decline or because rich become richer. Considering
various scenarios, they conclude that an increase in wealth inequality has an indetermi-
nate outcome both with respect to the decision of the poor on whether or not to enter
the crime “industry” and with respect to the decision of those already participating in
illegal pursuits to increase or decrease their level of activity. An possible explanation
of this indetermination may be given by the conclusion of the model by Bourguignon
et al. [11] discussed below. Notice that, since the basic assumption of the economic
models is that individuals are payoff maximizers, the equilibria generally correspond to
stereotyped populations partitioned into poor criminals and rich law abiders.
There is a huge number of theoretical publications in the economics literature of
crime. Among the subjects considered we may mention, for example, the relation be-
tween education and crime [32], optimal law enforcement [46, 45, 67], the consequences
of criminal’s uncertainty in the estimation of punishment probabilities [92], the differ-
ence in crime rates and law enforcement expenditures between the US and Europe [22],
etc. A complete list of the covered subjects is well beyond the scope of this paper.
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3.2 Social models
Economic theory has been very fruitful in producing predictions that encouraged many
of the statistical studies described in the preceding sections. However, besides the
validation difficulties of economic models, there is a deeper reason why they may fail
in explaining crime trends in societies. Like in standard equilibrium theories, the
economics approaches to crime modeling assume constant signs for the first and second
order derivatives of the loss function. That is, they consider “well behaved” monotonic
supply and demand curves, which ensure the existence of a single equilibrium. Such
theories cannot account for phenomena where social interactions are important, as is
certainly the case in the domain of crime. Social interactions may be responsible for
bandwagon effects [96, 50], non-monotonic demand curves in economy [87, 83, 49],
hysteresis in the dynamical behaviors [82], and more generally, positive feedback loops
in the dynamics of the social system.
The models presented in this section take into account the existence of social influ-
ences, either explicit or indirect, among individuals. These introduce nonlinearities in
the equilibrium and the dynamical equations, which may give rise to multiple equilib-
ria. The state of the system depends then on its history. Glaeser et al [47] suggested
that social interactions may explain the large variance in crime on different cities of the
US.
A non-linear economics model that takes into account the interaction between work-
ers and firms displays multiple equilibria due to endogenous wage dispersion [14]. In
the model, rational individuals that are either unemployed or workers, choose whether
to commit crimes or not, and whether to accept wage offers from firms. The wage offers
posted by the firms depend on the fraction of offenders in the population, which in turn
depend on the wage offers. This entails the existence of multiple stereotyped equilibria
where all the unemployed are criminals, and differ in the proportion of workers that
choose to commit crimes.
More recent approaches use concepts from ecology, epidemics, statistical physics,
and implement agent based simulations. Here we give a short overview, since there are
many examples in the present volume.
One of the first attempts to understand the spread of social problems using an
epidemic contagion model is due to Crane [20]. Using ideas from Schelling’s tipping
model [95], he assumes that social problems are contagious and spread through peer
influence. The model is tested on data of school dropout and teenage childbearing.
The probability that a child will drop out depends on individual characteristics and
on the quality of his neighborhood. There is a jump of the probability of dropout
(and of childbearing) with decreasing neighborhood quality that corresponds to the
incidence of social problems reaching a critical point. Beyond that point the spread
process through contagion explodes. Another model that exhibits multiple equilibria
is the model of gang formation proposed by Crane et al. [21].
Campbell et al. (1997) [16] also treat criminality as an epidemics problem using
differential equations. Criminal activity is viewed as a social activity where “suscep-
tible” individuals S in contact with criminals C are prone to commit crimes, while
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non-susceptible individuals N are not. The dynamics of the crime rate growth is de-
scribed by differential equations, inspired from epidemiology and ecology, that include
a social pressure against C, and contamination of S by C. They consider the following
set of differential equations:
dN/dt = −θN + µS + β(N)C, (4)
dS/dt = θN − (µ+ α)S − λSC, (5)
dC/dt = αS − β(N)C + λSC, (6)
with the condition that the overall population remains constant (N + S + C = 1).
The different coefficients in (4) correspond to different factors that affect crime: demo-
graphics and economic conditions (θ, α), deterrence and social disapproval (µ, β(N)),
social interactions (λ). The nonlinearities in the level of crime associated with different
combinations of the parameters give raise to wide differences in the composition of the
population.
Another point of view comes from the ecological approach (see Nun˜o et al. (2008)
[85]) which studies the society as a predator-prey system with three kinds of individuals:
owners O are preys, criminals C are predators of O, the guards G are in turn predators
of both O and C. The evolution of the populations depends on the efficiency of the
guards G and on the competition between C and G. This kind of models allows one
to study mathematically different aspects of the routine activity theory [18], which
emphasizes that in order for a crime to occur there must be convergence of an offender,
a target and the lack of a guardian.
Models of social interactions within the tradition of statistical physics allow to inves-
tigate stylized facts parsimoniously, i.e. using as few parameters as possible. Although
published in the economics literature, the model proposed by Bourguignon et al. [11] to
explain the weak correlations of crime and inequality found in economic cross-sectional
analyses belongs to this category. The model assumes that the individuals in the pop-
ulation have idiosyncratic honesty levels and that the expected loot is a function of
this honesty level. The crime rates depend non-linearly on the honesty distribution, so
that only those individuals whose income is below some fraction of the average income
are determinant to explain crime rates. One of the main conclusions of this work is
that inequality changes affecting people that are above this limit are likely to have
no significant influence on the crime rate. This may explain the contradictory results
of the statistical analyses mentioned in section 2, which consider overall measures of
inequality.
Considering a population where individuals have inhomogeneous wages and idiosyn-
cratic propensities to commit crime, Gordon et al. [48] study the influence of different
punishment probabilities on crime rates. The model assumes that the honesty level of
the population changes according to whether criminals are or not arrested. There is
a critical value of the probability of punishment at which the system exhibits a phase
transition between a high-criminality situation and a relatively low criminality one.
The dynamics of the honesty levels are studied in another paper of this issue.
Multi-agents simulation approaches are useful to treat spatio-temporal patterns,
which are difficult to study analytically. They allow to explore large ranges of param-
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eters and make predictions of collective behaviors by taking into account idiosyncratic
characteristics of the individuals, the probability of encounters, the type of network
organization, etc. Several papers propose and explain general implementations (see for
example [13]) but there are few results published in the literature [35, 103, 51, 52]. The
strengths of these models are also their weaknesses: they have many adjustable param-
eters, and it is not easy to understand what are the causes of the obtained behavior.
Another type of model focuses on criminal networks. Ballester et al. [3] argue that
optimal policy against crime should remove the so called ‘key-player”, which is the
criminal who, once removed, leads to a maximum reduction in the aggregate crime.
The authors provide a characterization of such key player knowing the links in the
criminal network. This policy requires thus a very good knowledge of the criminals’
organization.
Spatio-temporal characteristics of crime, and in particular hot spots of residen-
tial burglary, have recently attracted interest [75, 51, 52, 8, 54] thanks in part to the
availability of GIS software. Short et al. [97] present a two-dimensional model where
potential burglars perform random walks and select houses according to their attrac-
tiveness. The latter increases whenever the house is burglarized, diffuses to neighboring
houses, in agreement with empirical observations, and decays on time in the absence of
criminal events. These ingredients allow to explain the emergence and dynamics of hot
spots. Studied both through simulations and analytically in the continuum limit, the
authors relate the emergence, the stabilization and the decline of the hot spots to the
local dynamics of the attractiveness of burglarized houses. The existence of hot spots
depends on the balance between the time decay rate and the space diffusion coefficient
of the attractiveness, as well as on the density of the potential burglars. This kind of
models can be implemented on realistic urban lattices to allow comparison with data.
Adjusting the parameters to simulate the spatio-temporal evolution of actual hotspots
may help in developing better methods of crime prevention.
4 Conclusion
Crime modeling should help to understand typical facts and predict how crime rates
are expected to vary when some parameters are modified. This is why in the first part
of the paper we looked for statistical evidence. However, we found large divergences in
the empirical conclusions, mostly based in linear regressions. Part of the problems come
from inherent difficulties in data collection, part from technical issues in the statistical
treatments, and also from a lack of models that include the non linearities that exist
in social systems.
There are many promising areas for future multidisciplinary research. Our under-
standing of crime data should improve by the use of new tools for temporal series
analysis and for clustering [44, 54, 9, 53]. Statistical studies are beginning to imple-
ment new tools from the field of Machine Learning, like neural networks [86] which
allow to go beyond simple linear regressions, or Independent Component Analysis [4]
that allows to disentangle local from global trends.
Statistical approaches should systematically include historical information about
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economic, juridical and political regulation changes that may explain some unexpected
or non-linear temporal behaviors, as in the example at the end of section 2.1, and in
the work by French and Heagerty [44]. Another source of noise in the studies comes
from changes in the definitions, by the institutional agencies, of the different crime
categories. Finally, one should keep in mind that statistical data at very local levels
may be not reliable because of lacks of reports that are, nevertheless, statistically non
significative at higher levels of aggregation.
Mathematical modeling of crime is emerging as a promising field. Thanks to sim-
plifying assumptions, non linear models like those presented in section 3 exhibit non
trivial behaviors and allow to identify the parameters responsible for these. The results
are expected to give new hints for the interpretation of the data in the statistical models
and to help devising new policies to deal with different aspects of crime.
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